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0. Introduction 
Peer disagreement presents religious believers, agnostics, and skeptics alike with an epistemological 
problem: how can confidence in any religious claims (including their negations) be epistemically 
justified? There seem to be rational, well-informed adherents among a variety of mutually 
incompatible religious and non-religious perspectives, and so the problem of disagreement arises 
acutely in the religious domain. In this paper, we show that the transformative nature of religious 
experience and identity poses more than just this traditional, epistemic problem of conflicting 
religious beliefs. In encountering one another, believers, agnostics, and skeptics confront not just 
different beliefs, but different ways of being a person. 
 
To transition between religious belief and skepticism is not just to adopt a different set of beliefs, 
but to transform into a different version of oneself. We argue that the transformative nature of 
religious identity intensifies the problem of pluralism by adding a new dimension to religious 
disagreement, for there are principled reasons to think we can lack epistemic and affective access to 
our potential religious, agnostic, or skeptical selves. Yet, access to these selves seems to be required 
for the purposes of decision-making that is to be both rational and authentic. Finally, we reflect on 
the relationship between the transformative problem of religious disagreement and what it shows 
about the epistemic status of religious conversion and deconversion, in which one disagrees with 
one’s own (transformed) self. 
 
In §1, we briefly characterize the problem of religious disagreement in its general form, which we 
view as a species of the more general problem of peer disagreement. In §2, we introduce the 
phenomenon of distinctly transformative experience, with an eye toward discussing the special case 
of religious experience. In §3, we describe at length how the transformative nature of religious 
experience seriously exacerbates and complicates the problem of religious disagreement. In §4, we 
pose a newew problem of religious disagreement that arises especially in cases of religious 
conversion or deconversion: disagreement with one’s own potential (or past) self. Finally, in §5 we 
offer concluding remarks. 
 
1. The Problem of Religious Disagreement 
The problem of religious disagreement is a species of the more general problem of peer 
disagreement. The problem of peer disagreement, in its basic form, is the problem someone faces 
when she believes that p and knowingly encounters someone who believes that ~p from a context of 
approximately equivalent reasoning ability, evidence, and position to know whether p. 
 
The problem of disagreement is especially acute for religious believers. There is a dizzying variety of 
mutually inconsistent religious beliefs in the world, much of it undergirded by centuries, sometimes 
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millennia, of deep thought alongside profound individual and collective experiences. The fact of 
religious pluralism means that, for virtually any religious belief that p, anyone who believes that p will 
face the problem of peer disagreement. 
 
Concomitant with the fact of pluralism, intrareligious epistemology has a tendency to exacerbate the 
problem of disagreement even further for religious believers. For example, unlike publicly available 
and easily repeatable experiences that might ground scientific or other ordinary belief, the religious 
experiences that partly undergird religious belief can be radically private in nature, recalcitrant to 
repetition and even, in some cases, linguistic expression. Moreover, the major religious traditions 
themselves are partly constituted by epistemological frameworks that sometimes require parochial 
sources of knowledge, e.g., particular scriptures, traditions, teachers, or even sui generis cognitive 
faculties. This exacerbates the problem because when two religious believers disagree, their 
disagreement may be epistemically incommensurate within any single epistemological framework. 
Contrast this with two people who disagree about where the closest coffee shop is located, or who 
come up with different answers to a mathematical problem: especially if they are epistemic peers, 
they are likely to agree about the basic epistemological framework for figuring such matters out. Not 
so for religious belief. 
 
Like its parent problem, the problem of religious disagreement is plausibly theorized as a problem of 
higher-order evidence, that is, evidence about the link between one’s beliefs and the first-order 
evidence or other desiderata of epistemic standing that undergird it. The fact that S disagrees with an 
epistemic peer, S*, provides S with higher-order evidence about the link between S’s belief that p and the 
evidence or S’s epistemic standing, not necessarily evidence about p itself. Through disagreement, S 
acquires defeasible evidence that there is something faulty in S’s evidence, reasoning, epistemic 
character, position, or some other aspect of S’s epistemic situation. 
 
We do not reject any of the above standard characterization of the problem of religious 
disagreement, as far as it goes. We argue that reflecting on the nature of transformative experience 
shows that religious disagreement is not only a matter of disagreement about particular religious 
propositions, or only a matter of disagreement with others. After introducing the concept of 
transformative experience, we address those issues in turn. 
 
2. Transformative Experience 
The standard, intuitive model of rational decision-making assesses the rationality of decisions with 
reference to an agent’s assessment of the probabilities and subjective values of the outcomes of her 
various options, typically in light of the assessments and preferences that she has at the point of 
decision. This model works well for lots of decisions that we make. Suppose you’re going to the 
movies and deciding whether to see the historical drama or the space opera. You’ve seen and like 
plenty of both genres, and you already know that you’re more in the mood for sci-fi. But you check 
online and see that the drama has considerably better reviews. The decision involves a potential 
gamble, but it’s not a mystery how you go about making it—you’re well enough informed about the 
probabilities and values to rationally make and act on a judgment.  
 
But it turns out that many other decisions that we make, including everyday decisions, involve 
deciding whether to have what Paul (2014) calls a transformative experience. Suppose you’re applying for 
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graduate school and deciding whether to pursue philosophy or theology. You’ve studied and enjoyed 
both subjects, and you’ve recently been on a philosophy kick. Like picking movie genres, this 
decision also involves a gamble, but it’s of a structurally different sort. You’re not necessarily well-
enough informed about the probabilities and values to rationally make and act on a judgment, at 
least not in the standard way. The decision point involves a gamble, but not just a gamble on 
whether you’ll enjoy yourself. You’re gambling on the very self that you’ll become. Pursuing philosophy 
may transform you in a way that pursuing theology wouldn’t—and vice versa. You have a rough idea 
of what it will be like, what and who you will be like, coming out of the movie theater, but this is not 
so for the divergent paths of graduate study in philosophy or theology. 
 
Transformative experiences are those experiences that change the agent in certain deep ways—
especially, experiences the very having of which modify an agent’s beliefs and valuations in a manner 
inaccessible to her current cognitive makeup. The nature of transformative experience seems to 
preclude authentic rational decision-making—at least, on the standard model. This is partly because, in 
order to assess the subjective values of the experiential outcomes of one’s options for oneself, one 
must in a sense project oneself into the future experiences and determine what their value is. That is 
to say, one must be able to have a certain kind of empathy with one’s (potential) future self. But if 
the candidate experiences will themselves transform one’s evaluative stance (Paul calls these personally 
transformative experiences), one loses the ability to make these valuations—at least in any direct way. 
Vis-à-vis rational decision-making, you don’t know what a transformative experience is like until it’s 
too late. The same goes for beliefs and other epistemic attitudes. Epistemically transformative 
experiences teach you something new, something that you could not know or see except through 
having the experience. So, if you want to gain this new information, and you aren’t willing to rely 
solely on the testimony of others, you have to, in a sense, take a leap in the dark. 
 
Because our discussion focuses on the largely sui generis phenomenon of religious experiences, it is 
worth re-emphasizing that our lives are chock-full of transformative decision-making. Everything 
from deciding whether to have children, to planning for end of life care, to embarking on gender 
transition, to thinking about illness or choosing medical treatments, involves making choices that 
may result in personal and epistemic transformation. Transformative experience is, then, quite 
ordinary.1 
 
3. Having Religious Beliefs and Being a Religious Person 
There is a thin, purely doxastic aspect of being religious that poses the problem of religious 
disagreement but does not necessarily implicate the additional problems of transformative 
experience. For example, someone might transition from bare atheism to bare theism in such a way 
that has little to no implication for their other beliefs, practices, evaluative assessments, and so on.2 
Ordinary religious belief, however, is not like this. Religion is not an exclusively epistemic 
phenomenon, but in its major forms implicates the whole of a person’s life. To be a religious person 
is not just to have some stereotypically religious beliefs, but to adopt a way of being in (and seeing) the 
world. 
 
1 On having children, see Paul (2015). On end-of-life care and issues having to do with dying, see Thompson 
(forthcoming). On gender transition, see McKinnon (2015). On illness, see Carel, Kidd, and Pettigrew (2016). On 
medical research, see Paul and Healy (2018). 
2 Antony Flew’s (2007) transition from atheism to mere deism is a possible example. See also Oppenheimer (2007). 
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In the context of considering religion in the real world, asking the question “What should I believe?” 
is really part of asking the question, “Who shall I become?” Becoming religious or irreligious is 
becoming a different kind of person, a person with a radically different set of lived experiences, 
values, and beliefs. 
 
The distinctive nature of religious transformation means that peer disagreement is not just a matter 
of conflicting belief, but of conflicting ways of being a person. The standard examples in the 
literature on peer disagreement, including examples having to do with mere religious beliefs, are not 
adequate to capture the full force and scope of this conflict.3 
 
To appreciate the complexity of religious disagreement in the context of possible transformative 
experience, it’s useful to consider an example confrontation between a skeptic and a religious 
believer. Although what follows is certainly not the only kind of confrontation there might be 
between believer and skeptic, we think it is sufficiently representative to serve our discussion.4 
 
First, consider the believer. The believer exults in the rich satisfaction of his faith, in the communal 
life, traditions, and revelations which attend the experience of opening his mind to God. His belief 
in God, we can assume, is not arrived at by mere rational deliberation. Rather, his faith is a matter of 
the total and all-encompassing orientation of his whole life.5 For the believer, Pascal’s description of 
God’s relationship to believers strongly resonates: 
 
[H]e is a God who fills the soul and heart of those whom he possesses; he is a God who 
makes them inwardly aware of their wretchedness and his infinite mercy; who unites himself 
to the depths of their soul; who fills their soul with humility, joy, confidence, love; who 
makes them incapable of any other end but himself (Pascal 2005: S690, 227-8). 
 
Moreover, the believer finds within himself no ability to conceive of relationship with God as 
anything but good. In the words of Marilyn Adams, “intimate relation to [divine goodness] is … 
incommensurately good for created persons.”6 
 
Now consider the skeptic. The skeptic has no such experience of God and desires no such 
relationship. He sees no compelling physical evidence for the existence of God, and reasons that, if 
there were a God, there’d be some sort of compelling evidence of his existence.7 Moreover, the 
godless perspective on life does not depress him. In fact, the skeptic finds that his lack of belief in 
 
3 For a different and important perspective on a puzzle raised by transformative experience for religious disagreement, 
see De Cruz (2018). De Cruz argues that the transformative nature of conversion makes it difficult to tell whether 
someone you regard as a peer should still be so regarded by you after they (de)convert. Her central question is whether 
and how transformative conversion changes the evidential value of what would otherwise be peer disagreement. 
4 For an extended discussion of the material in this section, see Paul (forthcoming 2020),  “Transformative religious 
experience and the paradox of empathy”, Episteme. 
5 For an extended discussion from the Christian perspective that we find highly congenial, see William Abraham, Crossing 
the Threshold of Divine Revelation. 
6 Marilyn Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (26, 82-83). 
7 J.L. Schellenberg has developed this intuitive thought in a variety of creative ways. For an up-to-date treatment, see his 
recent book, The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. 
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God (and, in particular, an afterlife) imbues the world with a distinctive value, a kind of preciousness 
that it would not otherwise have. 
 
As rationally sensitive people, both the believer and the skeptic feel the need to confront their 
disagreement head-on; they recognize that it won’t do simply to retreat into their respective first-
order beliefs. 
 
The skeptic concludes that belief in God probably amounts to indulging in a psychological need for 
comfort. He doesn’t begrudge the believer for having such a need, but he has no desire to engage in 
what he takes to be an exercise in self-deception. From his perspective, he is the clearer thinker: in 
the cold hard light of day, he reasons to the most likely conclusion. 
 
The believer, when confronted with the reasoning of the skeptic, argues that the skeptic has jumped 
the epistemic gun: in order to be properly receptive to the evidence, one must first be open to 
detecting it. To borrow the terminology of Paul Moser, the skeptic must be properly “attuned” to 
the kind of “purposively available evidence” that God would provide, that is to say, evidence 
available only to those with the kind of attitudes and character that are conducive to the sort of 
relationship with created persons that God would want.8 To properly assess the case for and against 
belief, the skeptic should not only open his mind to the metaphysical possibility of divine creation, 
but he must additionally develop an openness to the possibility of total, unmitigated submission to 
the will of another—God. While this all surely involves rational inquiry, it also involves religious 
practice and radical transformation of character. Only under these conditions can he expect to detect 
evidence that would be relevant to his assessment, should there be any. 
 
But the skeptic may reasonably refuse. Why? It may seem that refusal to be open to the perspective 
of the other side, refusal to fully participate in the activities the believer finds significant, smacks of 
intolerance and irrationality. If the skeptic is truly interested in unbiased assessment of both sides of 
the question, how can he refuse to engage in this way? In our example confrontation, isn’t it the 
skeptic who is really engaging in an act of self-deception, a case study of closed-mindedness? 
 
Not necessarily. Both the pleas of the believer and the resistance of the skeptic suggest that their 
dispute has additional structure beyond mere epistemic disagreement. 
 
Notice that the religious experience of conversion is just the sort of transformative experience that 
can radically revise both one’s epistemic perspective and personal commitments. In his classic study 
of religious experience, William James describes cases of instantaneous conversion as events in 
which “often amid tremendous emotional excitement or perturbation of the senses, a complete 
division is established in the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new.”9 Deciding to 
potentially undergo such an experience is to make a decision of tremendous personal consequence.10 
As James writes, 
 
 
8 Paul Moser, The Elusive God. 
9 William James, Varieties, Lecture 10, p. 162. 
10 See De Cruz (2018)’s important qualification that transformative conversions need not be instantaneous, but can be 
(and, as empirical research suggests, usually are) gradual (267-268). 
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It makes a great difference to a man whether one set of his ideas, or another, be the centre 
of his energy; and it makes a great difference, as regards any set of ideas which he may 
possess, whether they become central or remain peripheral in him. To say that a man is 
“converted” means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his 
consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of 
his energy.11 
 
So, if having a religious experience is transformative, then issues concerning alien perspectives and 
preferences arise. In this context, we can understand the skeptic’s resistance as involving aversion to 
becoming a certain kind of possible self. Right now, of course, he is sure he is right—he does not 
believe God exists, and he does not think he should (in the epistemic sense) believe that God exists.   
 
But there is more than that. He fears that, if he truly imagined or engaged with the perspective of the 
believer—perhaps going so far as to experimentally engage in religious practice and open his mind 
up to total submission to God—it might change not just his beliefs, but his character and values in a 
way that, from his current perspective, he cannot sanction. He is not quite afraid, in the first 
instance, that he’ll simply gain new evidence that, given his current preferences and perspective, will 
change his assessment of the situation; on the contrary, he’s happy to read some natural theology 
here and there. Rather, he is afraid that having a religious experience will corrupt his intellectual 
capacities and wider cognitive life somehow. That is, he is afraid that having a religious experience 
will transform him both epistemically and personally. It will transform him in a way that will make 
him psychologically alien to his current self—and only then will he (that is, his alien self) find what 
seems to be evidence for God. Of course, that potential self won’t have any problem with this, but 
that’s precisely part of what is so disturbing by the skeptic’s present lights. 
 
Now, what sort of experience is involved here from the point of view of the believer? The believer 
takes it to be the spiritual experience of recognizing the divine, mediated by a distinctive cognitive 
faculty, perhaps what John Calvin famously defended as the sensus divinitatis. The sensus divinitatis, or 
the faculty that tends to produce belief in God in the right circumstances, involves one’s capacity to 
know God. It has a cognitive, quasi-perceptual component, and when exercised, endows one with a 
grasp or understanding of God’s divine majesty. 
 
Alvin Plantinga, following both Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, describes sensing the divine as 
analogous to experiencing the world in other sensory ways, such as tasting honey or seeing red for 
the first time. But religious experience, unlike these examples, is not merely epistemic. Like Pascal, 
Moser, and James, Plantinga understands such experiences as involving a reorientation of the whole 
person. He writes, “Conversion… is fundamentally a turning of the will, a healing of the disorder of 
affection that afflicts us. It is a turning away from love of self, from thinking of oneself as the chief 
being of the universe, to love of God.”12 
 
On this account, the exercise of the sensus divinitatis involves experiencing the moral and authoritative 
qualities of God in a way that necessitates change in the subject of the experience. Once you have 
 
11 James, Lecture 9, p. 147. 
12 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 311. 
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the experience, you very naturally and easily are moved to faith. You naturally reflect and develop a 
belief in God via this very reflection—it’s not hypnosis or like being drugged. 
 
On a picture where manifesting one’s capacity to engage with the divine leads one noninferentially 
and naturally to believe in and wholly submit to God, we can interpret the resistance of the skeptic 
as a resistance to any future that involves the real possibility of becoming someone who is not 
currently a candidate self for him.13 
 
So, it’s not mere fear of epistemic change that keeps the skeptic from taking belief seriously as an 
option. Rather, it’s fear of losing one’s connection to one’s past selves, and of becoming a future self 
who is alien to one’s current self. 
 
These reflections give us a better model for what is going on in the disagreement between the 
skeptic and the believer. The skeptic isn’t merely stubbornly defending the status quo, and he isn’t 
merely resisting a change in perspective. Instead, the skeptic is confronted with the argument that to 
truly and fairly assess the value of believing in God, he should open his mind and allow himself to 
potentially transform into a radically alien self.  
 
Mere descriptions of this experience fall short, of course, just as mere descriptions—for the 
uninitiated—of what it is like to see red or what it is like to taste honey, fall short. The skeptic must 
have the experience itself in order to understand and fully grasp the divine. 
 
This poses a familiar problem, cast in a new light. The trouble is that, if the skeptic is deliberating 
over whether to allow himself to have the experience, he cannot cognitively model how he will 
respond to the experience before he has it. He simply has to have the experience to know what it is 
like and how he will respond. In the case of religious disagreement over theistic faith, the issue of 
whether or not to become a religious person is inextricably linked to the issue of whether or not to 
believe in God. Suppose the skeptic wants to do everything he can to find out whether God exists, 
but also wants to preserve an authentic, recognizable self in the course of doing so. It seems that he 
may be incapable of doing both of these things. 
 
This means that the skeptic must decide whether to allow himself to have the experience of sensing 
the divine without knowing, in the most salient respect, what to expect, and potentially without 
being able to determine whether his subsequent experiences are veridical. 
 
That is to say, if he opens his mind so that he can experience God, he risks losing (his current self’s) 
control of his values, preferences, and beliefs, and becoming someone who is psychologically alien 
to him now—whether or not God really exists. In particular, he risks becoming someone who thinks 
very differently about the fundamental nature of the world and who evaluates experience very 
differently from how he does now, and he finds such a perspective and having such a value structure 
to be cognitively alien to who he presently is. 
 
 
13 By “candidate self,” we mean something different from what William James calls a live option. Even a self that is a live 
option may nevertheless not be a “candidate self” for you, in the event that the self’s beliefs and values would be 
fundamentally alien to those you currently hold.  
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So, the skeptic risks losing permanent control of his beliefs and preferences in a way that entails he 
would be alienated from the future self that would result from the change. And this is why the 
skeptic refuses to entertain the perspective of the believer or to explore the possibility of awakening 
the sensus divinitatis in himself. 
 
The worry, of course, isn't just one for the skeptic. We’ve spent our time developing the case for the 
skeptic, but the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the believer, especially one who is deeply and 
authentically repulsed by the forlorn existence of the skeptic. From the believer’s point of view, it 
may be that only “the fool says in his heart, “There is no God.””14 From his current standpoint, he 
may think that non-belief is the result of “sin and its cognitive consequences,” a malfunction of sensus 
divinitatis due to various moral failings, especially a kind of arrogance that resists submission to 
God.15 
 
With this, we can see how confronting religious disagreement in a rational manner implicates the 
problems of exploring religious transformative experience and the problematic metaphysics of the 
self. In the case of religious disagreement, one cannot escape problems of belief change and self-
deception. This discussion of religious disagreement also brings out deep ways in which empathy for 
our other selves connects to ideas about how we understand, control, and form ourselves, and to 
central issues involving living in a religiously pluralistic society. 
 
4. Transformative Self-Disagreement 
Religious pluralism raises the problem of disagreement in a straightforward and particularly acute 
way, and we have shown how problems of transformative experience complicate how one responds 
to it. But by reflecting on the nature of transformative experience and its relationship to religious 
belief and personhood, we can see that religious conversion raises an additional, distinct (problem of 
disagreement, namely, disagreement with one’s former or possible selves.16 
 
To see the problem clearly, we need to carefully distinguish between two kinds of conversion. 
Imagine someone raised in a secular environment who has never encountered the arguments of 
natural theology. Such a person may encounter these arguments, convert, and rightly judge that their 
conversion involved an advancement of knowledge (at the very least, knowledge of more reasons in 
favor of theistic belief). So described, this is not the kind of conversion that raises a problem of peer 
disagreement with oneself, because the pre- and post-conversion selves are decidedly not epistemic 
peers, even by their own lights. The transformative conversion at issue in this paper is of a different kind. 
The convert may not have learned new, objective information, but instead come to see the world—
that is, the same old facts—in a new light. In such a case, the convert may not find it possible to 
imaginatively inhabit her own old perspective, and the potential convert may not find it possible to 
imaginative inhabit her possible new perspective. Compare: after deciding to see the sci-fi movie, 
 
14 Psalm 14:1. 
15 See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, chapter 7. 
16 Helen De Cruz (2018) introduces and addresses the problem of how a convert should see her former self vis-à-vis 
epistemic peerhood (268-270). De Cruz sees this problem as one about irrelevant influences: the convert has reason to 
worry that her new beliefs are the result of causes that are not sensitive to the truth. De Cruz marshals sociological and 
other evidence to argue that it is not obvious that post-conversion beliefs have a comparative advantage here. “The 
factors underlying conversion cases do not seem to be more epistemically vicious or benign than factors underlying 
original religious belief formation (for example, parental religious affiliation)” (170). 
 9 
you can easily access what it was like before you saw it. And you could imagine either liking or 
hating the movie ahead of time. But after, say, having a child, it’s remarkably difficult to 
imaginatively re-inhabit what your world was like before, and you can’t (accurately) imaginatively 
inhabit the new world with your child before you have them. 
 
Intuitively—but, we think, mistakenly—religious (de-)conversion even of this second, 
transformative kind is thought to be either an advancement or a regression. Often this depends on 
whether one is taking an internal or external point of view. For example, a convert to a religious or 
irreligious perspective may claim that their newfound identity reflects an advancement of their 
knowledge of the world or an improvement in their character. Likewise, a detractor (say, someone 
dismayed that their family member has become religious) may think the opposite, that the convert 
has in fact become more ignorant or confused about the world.17 
 
This is all regarding how conversion looks from the inside versus the outside, where the subject of 
the conversion is understood to be necessarily “on the inside”. The standard assumption is that, 
from the inside, conversion necessarily looks like an advancement. But if we assume that a religious 
convert has undergone a transformative conversion, then the convert in fact may face a problem even from 
within her own perspective, because in the deepest metaphysical sense she is not “on the inside” with 
respect to both her former and newly converted selves.18 Given the epistemically and personally 
transformative nature of such a conversion, the convert may not be in a position to evaluate the 
conversion from an epistemically or personally neutral perspective.  
 
If the convert is aware of the problems of transformative experience, then she can know what her 
situation is—vis-à-vis transformation—and hence she can know that she is not in a position to know 
that she has advanced rather than regressed. Because she is not in a position to neutrally distinguish 
between her former and current epistemic positions, her relationship to her former self is 
structurally identical to the relationship of epistemic peer disagreement. To be sure, all that stands 
between her post- and pre-conversion self may be the conversion experience or process itself, but 
this is precisely the divide across which she cannot evaluate her epistemic and personal 
transformation. 
 
This means that religious believers and skeptics who arrive at their positions through (de-
)conversion are permanently faced with a problem of peer disagreement even beyond the usual 
problem of disagreement posed by pluralism. We call this the problem of transformative self-
disagreement. 
 
How should the convert respond to this problem? We think that the best responses will follow 
whatever are the best responses to peer disagreement generally. For example, if you’re a dogmatist 
 
17 For an extended discussion of how one ought to react to the conversion of a peer, see De Cruz (2018: 271-275). 
18 De Cruz (2018) argues that, even in cases of transformative conversion, the convert has one additional piece of 
evidence, namely the knowledge “that her religious beliefs can be changed” (270). Our response to this is twofold. First, 
this doesn’t address the forward-looking aspect of the problem that we present, the problem of disagreeing with one’s 
potential or future self. But more to the point, we don’t see why a person cannot, pre-conversion, know that her beliefs can 
change. After all, it’s precisely a change in beliefs (and way of being a person) that a would-be convert is justifiably 
worried about on our account. Our story about the believer and the skeptic in the previous section plausibly 
presupposes that both individuals know that they can change. 
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who thinks that it is reasonable to stand one’s ground in the face of peer disagreement, then you 
should think this in the case of transformative self-disagreement as well. According to this view, it is 
rationally permissible to fully endorse one’s post-conversion beliefs, even though one does not have 
independent reason to think that one is in a better position to know than before. If you’re a 
conciliationist who think that it is reasonable to “split the difference” or otherwise lower your 
credence in your own beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, then you should think this in the case 
of transformative self-disagreement as well. According to this view, it is rationally obligatory to 
lower one’s credence in light of the fact that one has no independent reason to think that one is in a 
better position to know than before. 
 
Our understanding of the problem of religious disagreement with oneself, especially as it relates to 
the conciliationist response to that problem, is connected to a problem developed by Daniel Garber 
for the epistemology implicit in Pascal’s famous wager argument. According to Garber, “wagering” 
for God (by engaging in religious practice as if God exists) is a kind of inquiry that may reveal God’s 
existence to the wagerer only if God exists, but may nevertheless produce belief in God even if God does 
not exist. One incurs a certain epistemic risk by engaging in religious practice, according to Garber. 
One the one hand, if Pascal is right, there is a kind of synchronic guarantee: wagering that God 
exists makes it very likely that one will eventually come to (synchronically, internally) rationally 
believe that God exists, whether or not God exists. This is because, by one’s post-wagering lights, it 
will be rational to believe in God. But one also takes a diachronic risk: The process by which one 
comes to eventually (synchronically, internally) rationally believe that God exists is (diachronically, 
externally) rational only if, in fact, God exists. But you can’t evaluate whether or not God exists 
other than by your current lights, which wagering itself transforms. Hence, if God does not exist, it 
seems that wagering will land one in an epistemically bad position; not only will one have a false 
belief, but one will be diachronically irrational. But worst of all, the fact that one is diachronically 
irrational will be rationally inaccessible to one after wagering, because it will be indistinguishable from 
one’s position in the event that God does exist. 
 
Garber’s own novel question is how we should believe and act after wagering, given that we are 
aware of both our synchronic and diachronic positions.  With respect to belief, Garber thinks that 
the post-wagering believer should continue to believe, though she should continually review her 
evidence in light of the live possibility that she is “in the grips of a cognitive illusion.”19 With respect 
to action, Garber thinks that—in light of the diachronic risk undertaken—the believer should be 
extremely cautious in her employment of post-conversion assumptions, at least when the stakes are 
high. Understood as a way of responding to transformative self-disagreement, we think that this 
response is consonant with conciliationist positions the literature on peer disagreement. The 
transformed believer (or skeptic) does not merely face the possibility of illusion. She faces that 
possibility, but she faces it partly because she faces disagreement with her own former self, who she 
has no grounds for assessing as anything other than an epistemic peer. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although the problem of religious disagreement is a species of the general problem of peer 
disagreement, it brings with it special problems having to do with transformative experience. We 
have highlighted two such special problems. The first problem is that religious disagreement does 
 
19 Garber, 53. 
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not consist in a mere conflict of beliefs, it consists in a conflict between different ways of being a 
person. This fact alone makes it intelligible and rational that one might resist full engagement with 
one’s peers who disagree on religious matters. The second problem is that religious disagreement 
does not only exist between oneself and one’s peers—it exists in a strong form across one’s own 
selves. This suggests that the problem is even more serious than has been recognized, for unlike 
one’s external peers, one cannot escape the specter of one’s former, pre-transformed self. 
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